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MILKOVICH VS. LORAIN JOURNAL CO.: IS THE
SUPREME COURT "HOLDING THE BALANCE
TRUE" IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS?
INTRODUCTION
Andy Rooney, the outspoken commentator on the television show, Sixty
Minutes, was sued for defamation for comments he made in an April 17, 1988
broadcast of the show.' In his show-ending commentary, Mr. Rooney discussed his
annoyance with receiving junk mail.2 Commenting on the product "Rain-X", of
which he had received a complementary supply in the mail, Mr. Rooney stated that
"Rain-X" didn't work.3 Is such a statement considered defamatory under today's
law or is it protected under the first amendment?4
For the past sixteen years, federal circuit courts5, state courts6, and the
American Law Institute7 have considered expressions of opinion to be absolutely
'Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir., 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3701 (U.S. April 15,
1991).
2Id. at 1051.
I1d.
4 Id. at 1052. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling that the statements were
not defamatory. However the court of appeals used the standard outlined in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal,
Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990) and was the first court to do so.
'See, e.g., Biggs v. Village of Dupo, 892 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir. 1990); Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300 (8th Cir.
1988); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988); Fudge v. Penthouse Intern, Ltd., 840
F.2d 1012 (lst Cir. 1988); Falls v. Sporting News Publishing Co., 834 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1987); Potomac
Valve & Fitting v. Crawford Fitting, 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1987); Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507 (9th
Cir. 1987); McCabe v. Rattinger, 814 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1987); Yagman v. Baden, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir.
1986); Keller v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 778 F.2d 711 (1 th Cir. 1985); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788
F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.
1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304 (1983); Cianciv. New
York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (1980); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 982 (1980); Orr v. Argus-press co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960
(1979).
6 See, e.g., Bland v. Verser, 299 Ark. 490, 774 S.W.2d 124 (1989); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc.,
440 N.W.2d 884 (Iowa 1989); Casso v. Brandt, 776 S.W. 2d 551 (Tex 1989); Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So.
2d 378 (La. 1988); Gernander v. Winona State University, 428 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. App. 1988); Johnson v.
Delta-Democrate Pub. Co., 531 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1988); Frignon v. Morrison-Maierle, 233 Mont. 113,760
P.2d 57 (1988); Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248 (Del. 1987); Turnerv. Welliver, 226 Neb. 275,411 N.W.2d
298 (1987); Miskovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587 (Okla. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 923
(1982); Pease v. Telegraph Pub. Co., 121 N.H. 62, 426 A.2d 463 (1981).
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, Section 566 (1976) and accompanying comments. Section 566
provides:
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a
statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
But see, Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2702-03. The Milkovich Court interpreted section 566, comment a, to state
that defamatory statements are actionable regardless of whether they are statements of opinion or fact.
1
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protected from defamation liability under the First Amendment. The courts have
interpreted the United States Supreme Court's Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.' opinion
to direct that only false statements of fact are actionable because opinions "depend
for [their] correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas". 9
Since this supposed creation of an absolute constitutional privilege for
expressions of opinion, lower courts have struggled to develop a consistent method
of distinguishing statements of opinion from fact.10 Until now, the Supreme Court
has refused to review this issue."
However, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,1 2 the Supreme Court ruled that
opinions are not afforded absolute First Amendment Protection. 3 The court even
offered a test whereby lower courts can determine whether a statement is constitu-
tionally protected.'4
This Note examines the background of defamation law and the Milkovich
court's reasoning. The Note will discuss the Milkovich test's ability to distinguish
fact from opinion and its potential future impact on broadcasters and journalists in
the United States.
BACKGROUND
The Evolution of the Fact/Opinion Distinction
The common law defines defamation as a false communication, written 5 or
8418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9 Id. at 339-340. The Court stated, "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."
1o See generally, Schneider, A Model for Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected
"Ideas", 43 ARK L. REv. 57 (1990); The Illusion of the Fact-Opinion Distinction in Defamation Law, 39
CAsE W. L. REv. 867 (1988-89); The FactlOpinion Distinction:An Analysis ofthe Subjectivity ofLanguage
and Law, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 673 (1987).
" See, e.g., Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Hammerhead
v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 237 (1983); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.,
759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1985), affd on reh'g, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 272
(1986); Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985);
Tavoularas v. Piro, 817 F-2d 762 (D.C. Cit. 1986), cert. denied, 479 S.Ct. 200 (1987); Ault v. Hustler
Magazine, 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1532.
12 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990).
13 Id. at 2705. The Milkovich court provided:
We do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled "opinion". ...Not only would such an
interpretation be contrary to the tenor and context of the passage, but it would ignore the fact
that expressions of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of objective fact. Id.
14 Id. at 2707. The "dispositive question" in defamation suits is whether a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that a statement impl[ies] an assertion of objective fact.
"Libel is the "publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical
form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of
written or printed words." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section 568(l)(1977).
AKgON¢ LAW P~vimw [Vol. 24:2
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spoken 16, that injures an individual's reputation. 17 Under early defamation law, the
plaintiffs only burden was to introduce the alleged defamatory statement into
evidence. '8 The defendant then carried the burden of proving that the statement was
true. 19 The plaintiff was not required to prove the defendant's fault.2" A conflict
eventually developed between defamation law and the constitutional right to
freedom of expression.2' As a result, the qualified "fair comment" 22 privilege was
developed to balance the conflicting interests of freedom of expression and an indi-
vidual's right to protect his or her reputation. 23
Fair Comment: The First Fact/Opinion Distinction
The distinction between opinion and fact was first made under the common
law privilege of fair comment.24 The fair comment privilege protected opinions on
matters of legitimate public interest from defamation liability.25 Thus, the fair
comment privilege emerged to protect alleged defamatory statements which could
not be proven true or false because they were the writer's or speaker's "opinion". 26
Constitutional Concerns: New York Times and Its Progeny
Defamation was traditionally regulatedby state commonlaw until 1964, when
the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to media defendants in its
landmark case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.27 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority in New York Times, stated that the first28 and fourteenth29 amendments must
apply to both statements of fact and opinion to encourage unrestrained debate on
public issues. 30 Because defendants in defamation cases were required to prove the
6 Slander is the "publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures or by any form of
communication other than those stated in Subsection (1), "Id. at section 568(2).
'
7 W. PROSSER, W. KEETON, D. DOaBs, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, Trm LAW OP TORTS, 771, 773(5th ed. 1984).
, RESTATMEmr (SEcoND) OF TORTS, section 613(1938) outlined a defamation plaintiff's burden of
proof.(defamatory character of the communication, its publication by the defendant, its application to the
plaintiff, the understanding of its defamatory meaning by a third party, and injury to the plaintiff).
'9 Id., section 581A.
2
old., section 613.
2 See Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARv. L. Ray. 1207, 1212-1213 (1949); A. Meildejohn, Political Freedom
(1965).
22See RESTAThmNr (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 18, sections 606-610.
See Note, supra note 21 at 1207.
The fair comment defense required the defendant to establish: 1) that the statement was opinion, not fact;
2) that the opinion was based upon true facts; 3) that the opinion was not an overly personal attack on the
plaintiff; 4) that the opinion related to a matter of public interest. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
OF TORTS 820 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 18, section 606.
2 SEE W. PROSSER, IHANDBOOK OF Ta LAW OF TORTS, supra note 17 at 773.
26Schneider, A Modelfor Relating Defamatory "Opinions" to First Amendment Protected "Ideas", 43 ARK
L. Ray. 57, 91 (1990).
27 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Id. at 269. "The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the
First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions."
Id. at 292 n. 30.
30 Id. at 279. "A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
3
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truth of their statement, commentators were discouraged from criticizing official
conduct." The Court concluded that the Constitution required a public official to
prove that the defendant uttered the statement with "actual malice. 32
Thus, New York Times represents the first time that first amendment rights
were emphasized in the balance between protection of individual reputation and
freedom of expression.
Since New York Times, the Supreme Court has further defined the proper
balance between freedom of expression and the protection of individual reputation.33
In doing so, the Supreme Court has extended additional constitutional protection to
media defendants.M The Court has determined that "statements which cannot
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts" are not defamatory. 35 The New York
Times "actual malice" standard extends to plaintiffs who are either public figures or
public officials.36 Further, a private plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that
a media defendant's statements which regarded a public concern were false. 7
In New York Times, the Supreme Court hinted that statements of opinion
might be constitutionally protected.38 However, ten years later, dicta in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 39 seemingly established the absolute privilege for opinion which
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a comparable
'self-censorship'." Id.3 Id. "Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism,
even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.. .The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate." Id.
32 Actual malice was defined by the court as "knowledge that the [statement] was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-280.
"See infra notes, 35-37.
34 Id.
"See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). In Greenbelt, the plaintiff,
a local real estate developer, was negotiating with the city to acquire a zoning variance. At the same time,
the city was attempting to buy property owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to use his property
as leverage to obtain the zoning variance. This attempted leverage was discussed at city council meetings.
The defendant published news reports quoting council members describing the plaintiff's techniques as
"blackmail." Id. at 7. The Supreme Court ruled that the word "blackmail" in these circumstances was not
defamatory. "Even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical
hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered [the developer's] negotiation position
extremely unreasonable." Id. at 13-14; See also, Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-282 (1974),
infra, note 43; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, (1988), infra, note 43.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
37 Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). The Court reasoned that the common-law
presumption that defamatory speech is false deterred true speech on matters of public opinion. Therefore,
in cases involving a question of the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving falsity.
38 376 U.S. at 292, n. 30. The Court provided that: "Since the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition
of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must
be afforded for honest expressions of opinion based upon privilege, as well as true, statements of fact."
19 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-340.
[Vol. 24:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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many lower courts have recognized.40 In Gertz, the court stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of
other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact.41
Federal courts of appeals and several state courts interpreted the Gertz dicta
to define the point at which protection from defamation must yield to the first
amendment protection of free expression.42
The Supreme Court seemingly supported the lower courts' interpretation of
Gertz in two other Supreme Court cases: National Association of Letter Carriers v.
Austin "and Falwell v. Hustler Magazine.45 However, according to the Milkovich
Court, the lower courts have improperly interpreted the Gertz dicta. The Milkovich
court reasoned that the Letter.Carriers and Hustler opinions merely place constitu-
tional limits on the types of speech which may be subject to state defamation actions
and did not grant constitutional immunity to opinions."
The Tests That Courts Developed to Distinguish Fact From Opinion47
Priorto its ruling inMilkovich, the Supreme Courthadnot yet articulated a test
to distinguish opinion from fact.4" Thus, the lower courts developed several different
40 Gertz was not decided on the issue of fact/opinion distinction. Rather, the main thrust of the decision
addressed the distinction between a private individual plaintiff and public official orpublic figure plaintiff.
The Court held that the New York Times higher standard of actual malice does not apply to a private plaintiff.
However, to insure consitutional protection for the media, a private individual must prove fault and cannot
collect punitive damages without showing actual malice. Id. at 342-352.
41 Id. at 339-340 (footnote omitted).
42 See cases cited supra, notes 5 and 6. But see, Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 539 F.2d 54, 62-
63 (2d Cir. 1980); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 604, 552 P.2d 425, 430
(1976)(dictum); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart &Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369,382,397, N.Y.S.2d 943,951,366
N.F_. 2d 1299, 1307 (1977). These courts have held that the constitutional protection of opinion does not
apply to accusations of dishonesty or criminal conduct.
" See National Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)(Union's use of the word "scab" to
describe workers who had refused to join the union was an opinion protected under federal labor law.) Id.
at 284.
"Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)(Publisher was not liable for invasion of privacy for
publishing an advertisement parody about a public figure. The court intended to protect "the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.") Id. at 879.
4
- Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2705.
46 Id. at 2705.
"I The organization of this section is modeled after the Respondent's Brief, at 36-48, Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990)(No. 89-645).
41 See Note, Structuring Defamation Law to Eliminate the Fact-Opinion Determination: A Critique of
Ollman v. Evans, 71 lowA L. REv. 913,918 (1986). See also Kelier v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 778 F.2d 711,
717 (11 th Cir. 1985)(without Supreme Court guidance, courts have struggled to formulate a workable test.). 5
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tests to make this distinction.49 Some courts have cautioned that no single test can
incorporate all of the constitutional considerations implicit in the fact/opinion
distinction. The courts have noted that "the potential for erroneous condemnation
of harmless or beneficial speech should make courts reluctant to embrace in
structured, multi-factor 'tests'."5 0
1. Verifiability
Some courts used the text of "verifiability," which separates fact from opinion
on the basis of whether the challenged statement is capable of being proven true or
false. 51 However, standing alone, this test is useful only in cases which involve
opinions regarding personal taste.52  As a result, most courts have assessed
verifiability in conjunction with other factors, such as context.53 Verifiability is
probably best suited to be a "minimum threshold issue," not the sole basis for
identifying constitutionally protected opinion.'
2. Restatement Approach
Recognizing that verifiability, alone, cannot distinguish opinion from fact,
courts turned to the Restatement's test.55 This test draws distinctions between
statements of pure opinion and statements of mixed opinion.56 The Restatement test
attempts to measure the likelihood that the reader would accept the statement as
objective fact.57
49 See Note, Ohio Provides Even Greater Protection For Its Press, 15 N. Ky. L. Riffv. 153, 161 (1988).
50 Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Scott v. News Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243,
496 N.E.2d 699 (1986)(Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting in part). Justice Celebrezze stated that "the clarity of
today's majority opinion gives way to the amorphous 'totality of circumstances' test which is used to
comlete the Jekyll and Hyde transformation of this newspaper article from fact to opinion." Id. at 263,496
N.E.2d at 716. (footnote omitted). Justice Sweeney, also dissenting in part, stated that: "under the elastic
test adopted by today's majority, the only thing that is clear is that a statement's characterization as fact or
opinion is truly in the eye of the individual judge. Rather than providing 'predictability,' the cryptic totality
of the circumstances test leaves those in search of stability with as much guidance as that provided in the
newspaper's daily horoscope." Id. at 265, 496 N.E.2d at 717, n. 8 (Sweeney, dissenting in part).
S See Brief for Respondent, at 37, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990)(No. 89-645).
2See, e.g., Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. JourAzur S.A., 759 F.2d 219,219(2d Cir. 1985)(judgments based
upon personal tastes are not capable of being proven true or false); Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at
1289(verifiability is only relevant as it preserves the truth defense and protects statements which the
ordinary reader would perceive to be incapable of positive proof).
" See McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842-43 (1st Cir. 1987); Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1289-90.
s Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1288.
53 REsTATMEmr (SEcoND) oi ToRTs, Section 566 (1977). See supra note 7, quoting the RasraimNr test for
libel.
6 Id. A mixed opinion is defined as "one which, while an opinion in form or context, is apparently based
on facts regarding the plaintiff and his conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist
by the parties to the communication." Id. comment b. Under the Restatement test, statements of pure
opinion were given constitutional immunity. See Id., comment c. Statements of mixed opinion are
actionable if they imply that the author is alleging undisclosed defamatory facts through the opinion. Id.
section 566.
" See Brief for Respondent at 41-42, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990)(No. 89-645). The6
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3. Totality of the Circumstances Test
In an attempt to consider more of the "total picture" surrounding a statement,
several courts adopted a four step "totality of the circumstances" approach, or a
variation thereof.5 This test was first articulated in Oilman v. Evans. 59 Under the
"totality of the circumstances" test, courts analyzed the totality of circumstances in
which the statements were made and decided whether the average reader would view
the statement as fact or opinion.6" Although courts have adopted different factors,
their tests commonly seek to analyze the alleged defamation in the context of the
article or broadcast in which it is found and in the larger social context to which it
relates. 61
The Oilman "totality of circumstances" test consists of the following four
factors: (1) the precision of the language used;62 (2) the verifiability of the statements
made; 63 (3) the literary context in which the statements were made;' and (4) the
broader social context in which the statement were made.6  Some courts do not
believe that this mechanical analysis will effectively and predictably distinguish
opinion from fact.66 Other courts believe that the test cannot resolve the fact versus
opinion distinction when all four factors are not in agreement. 67
The development of defamation law since New York Times suggested
that the lower courts could not determine the proper scope of constitutional
protection for opinion. Both plaintiffs and the media defendants needed direction.
In Milkovich,68 the Supreme Court attempted to provide this direction.
Ninth Circuit has interpreted the Restatement test as follows:
The rule derives from the statement's effect on the reader. If an expression of opinion follows from
the nondefamatory facts that are either stated or assumed, the reader is likely to take the opinion for
what it is. Indeed, the reader is free to form another, perhaps contradictory opinion from the same
facts. But when the opinion derives from unstated or unassumed facts, the reader can only presume
that the publisher of the statement is asserting the facts to support the opinion as well. Lewis v. Time,
Inc., 710 F.2d at 555.
ss See e.g., Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cit. 1980);
Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1985), aff'd on reh'g, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 272 (1986); McCabe, supra note 53, 814 F.2d 839; Scott, supra note 50, 25 Ohio St.3d
243, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986); Keller v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 778 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1985).
9 See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
O illman, 750 F.2d at 979.
" Compare Lewisv. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d at 553 (three factors important in determining whethera statement
is fact or opinion) and Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 220, with Oilman, 750 F.2d 970 (four factors analysis).
2 See Ollman at 979-81.
'3 See Id. at 981-82.
"See Id. at 982-83.
' See Id. .at 983-84.
"See Scott, supra note 50 at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706 (the totality of circumstances test can "only be used
as a compass to show general direction and not a map to set rigid boundaries"); Oilman, at 993(Bork, J.,
concurring)(factor analysis too rigid).
67 See Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1288.
110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990). 7
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Facts
On February 9, 1974, Maple Heights High School hosted a wrestling match.
At the time, Petitioner Michael Milkovich, Sr. was the head wrestling coach for
Maple Heights High School.69 Following a controversial call against the Maple
Heights team70 and Milkovich's expressive hand gestures, a fight broke out among
spectators and members of both teams.7 1 Several people were injured in the
altercation.
72
On February 28, 1974, the Ohio High School Athletic Associations ("OHSAA")
held a hearing on the incident.73 Both Milkovich and the Superintendent of Maple
Heights Public Schools, H. Don Scott, testified at the hearing.74 As a result of the
hearing, OHSAA placed the Maple Heights wrestling team on probation for one year
and declared the team ineligible for the 1975 state wrestling tournament.75 OHSAA
also censured Milkovich.76
Following the OHSAA ruling, several wrestlers and their parents sued
OHSAA in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County for an alleged denial of
due process.? Milkovich and Scott also testified at this proceeding.78 The trial court
ruled that OHSAA had violated the plaintiffs' due process rights in imposing sanc-
tions and the court ordered OHSAA to remove the suspension.79
The next day, J. Theodore Diadiun, a sports writer for the News-Herald, wrote
and published a column entitled "Maple beat the law with the 'Big Lie'."0 The
words "TD says" appeared beneath the title.8 The article appeared in the sports
section of the paper.8 2 The carry-overpage was entitled"... Diadiun says Maple told
69 Milkovich v. News Herald, 46 Ohio App.3d 20, 20 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1321 (1989).
70 Brief for Respondent at 4, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990). According to
Respondent's rendition of the facts, an undefeated Maple Heights wrestler was ahead on match points when
he fouled and injured a Mentor wrestler. Meet officials awarded the match to the injured Mentor wrestler
and Coach Milkovich became visibly upset. Following this, two Maple Heights wrestlers left their bench
and fought with at least one Mentor wrestler. Then the benches and stands cleared and the altercation
ensued.7
' Milkovich at 20, 545 N.E.2d at 1321.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. On March 5, 1974, the OHSAA issued a written censure to Milkovich and mailed copies to schools,
newspapers and television stations throughout Ohio. Brief for Respondents, supra, note 70 at 5 n. 2.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79Id.
80 See Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2698-99, n. 2 for the article in its entirety.
8 Milkovich, 46 Ohio App.3d at 20, 545 N.E. 2d at 1321.
82 Id.
[Vol. 24:2
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a lie."'8 3 Diadiun charged that Milkovich and Scott "... lied at the hearing after each
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." 4 Diadiun attended the wrestling
match and the OHSAA hearing, but was not present at the court proceedings.8 5
Diadiun, however, explained in the article that he had discussed the court proceed-
ings with Dr. Meyer, the OHSAA commissioner.8 6
After the article was published, Milkovich and Scott filed separate libel suits
against the News-Herald, its parent company, the Lorain County Journal and
Diadiun. 7 Milkovich alleged that nine passages 8 in the article were defamatory.
Milkovich asserted that the headline and nine passages of the article accused
him of perjury and damaged his reputation as a teacher and coach. 9 At a jury trial,
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the media defendants because Milkovich
was a public figure and had failed to establish "actual malice" as required by Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts.90
Procedural History
This case has developed a complicated procedural history over the past fifteen
years. After the trial court's directed verdict againstMilkovich, the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded because it believed that the jury could have found actual
malice. 9' The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed theNews-Heraldmotionto certify the
record. 92 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.93
83 Id.
" Id. at 20, 545 N.E. 2d at 1322.
95 Id.
86 Id.
s
7 Id. at 21, 545 N.E.2d at 1322.
U Id. Milkovich contested the following passages:
1) Maple beat the law with the "big lie,"...
2) ***[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple Heights High
School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor meet of last Feb. 8.
3) A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, it is well they learn early.
4) IT IS SIMPLY THIS: IF YOU GET IN A JAM, LIE YOUR WAY OUT.
5) If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you stand an
excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened.
6) The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling coach, Mike Milkovich and former
superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
7) Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer,
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn
oath to tell the truth.
8) But they got away with it.
9) Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high school administrators
and coaches? I think not. Id.
$9 Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2699-2700.
90 Milkovich v. News Herald, 15 Ohio St.3d 292, 293, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1192 (1984).
9' Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 65 Ohio App.2d 143,416 N.E.2d 662 (1979).
1 Motion to certify the record was overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court on March 20, 1980.
9 Lorain Journal Co., v. Milkovich, 449 U.S. 966 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan would 9
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Upon remand, the trial court granted News-Herald's motion for summary
judgment.94 The trial court found that the alleged statements were opinion and,
therefore, were protected under the first amendment95
Milkovich appealed this ruling.9 6 The Court of Appeals affirmed and found
that the defendants' statements were opinion and that Milkovich was a public figure
who had failed to prove actual malice. The Ohio State Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals. 9 The United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari. 99
However, two years later, in Superintendent Scott's case, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed its two year-old decision on the Diadiun article. i"o The court held that
the article contained constitutionally protected opinion.10' To distinguish fact from
opinion, the Scott court adopted the Olman "totality of circumstances" test.
1
'
2
Subsequently, in the Milkovich case, on remand to the trial court, the court
entered summ aryjudgment in favor of the newspaper 0 3 The court held that the Scott
case established, as a matter of law, that the Diadiun article contained constitution-
ally protected opinion."0 4 On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was
bound by the Scott Supreme Court ruling and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's
ruling. 5 The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the appeal."6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Ohio
have granted certiorari because the appellate court's interpretation would "chill the freedom" of Ohio
newspapers to publish their views. Id. at 970.
94 Milkovich, 46 Ohio App.3d at 21, 545 N.E.2d at 1322.
95d.
" Milkovich, 15 Ohio St.3d at 293, 473 N.E.2d at 1192-93.
9"/d.
-Id. at 297, 473 N.E.2d at 1196. The Ohio Supreme Court found Milkovich was a private person under
defamation law and thus was not required to prove actual malice. The court also found that the article
contained fact, not opinion. In ruling on the opinion issue, the court declined to establish a clear definition
of protected opinion. However, the court found the statements to be factual assertions because the article
did not clearly caution the reader that the statements were the author's opinion. The court followed the
reasoning in Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) that a writer must
do more than impliedly or explicitly use the words "I think" in order to qualify a statement as opinion. Id.
99 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
" Scott, supra note 50.
01 Id. at 254, 496 N.E.2d at 709. In overruling Milkovich, the Scott court contended that Milkovich offered
no test or analysis for concluding that the article's statements were factual. Thus, the Scott court refused
to apply stare decisis to a decision that would increasely confuse the distinction between fact and opinion.
In Scott, the court emphasized the importance of "providing assurance to local media that they will remain
free to print the news we need to know." Id. at 256, 496 N.E.2d at 710 (1986).
102 Id. at 250, 496 N.E.2d at 706 (1986). The Scott court found that the specific language used and the fact
that the statement was verifiable indicated that the statements were fact. However, the court found that the
general and broader context of the article suggested that the article was opinion. The court considered the
caption "T.D. Says", the subjectivity of the wording in the article, and the fact that the article was on the
sports page as indicative that the article was opinion. Id. at 250-54, 496 N.E.2d at 706-09.
" 
3 Milkovich, 46 Ohio App.3d at 22, 545 N.E.2d at 1323.104d.
105 Id. at 23, 545 N.E.2d at 1324.
Io' Milkovich, 43 Ohio St.3d 707, 540 N.E.2d 724.
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courts' recognition of a constitutional privilege for opinion.'t7
ANALYSIS
The United States Supreme Court addressed two issues inMilkovich. 101 First,
contrary to the rulings of the majority of lower courts, the Court clearly established
that a separate constitutional privilege for opinion does not exist. 19 Second, writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist outlined a test to help courts distinguish between
protected and unprotected statements. 10 Applying this test to Milkovich's claim,
the Court held that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Diadiun article
contained statements which implied that Milkovich had perjured himself."' The
Supreme Court remanded the case to Ohio state court for further proceedings.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with the
majority that a separate opinion privilege is unnecessary.1 2 He asserted that the
protections already afforded by the First Amendment are adequate." 3 However, the
dissenting Justices applied a different test to the facts and found that the Diadiun
article was not factual and, therefore, was constitutionally protected." 4
The Supreme Court's Basis For Abolishing the
Constitutional "Opinion Privilege"
The Supreme Court relied upon the New York Times progeny of cases to
abolish any separate privilege for opinion. 15 The Court outlined the pertinent
Supreme Court decisions which constitutionally protect speech that criticizes offi-
cial conduct." 6 These previous rulings extended first amendment freedom of
expression protection to encourage uninhibited debate about public issues, public
figures and public officials." 7 Therefore, the lower courts' reliance upon the Gertz
, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 863 (1990).
'"Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990).
,09 Id. at 2707.
"o Id. at 2707-08.
"I Id.
112 Id. at 2708.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2709.
1' Id. at 2703-05.
116 Id.
" Id. The Court relied upon the following Supreme Court rulings which established First Amendment
protection:
1) actual malice standard required for public figures (citing New York Times, supra note 27);
2) the private and public defamation plaintiff must prove fault (citing Philadelphia Newspapers,
supra note 37);
3) limitations on the type of speech that can be subject to defamation liability:
a) rhetorical hyperbole and loose figurative language protected (citing Greenbelt, supra
note 35 and Letter Carriers, supra note 43);
b) speech that could not reasonably have been perceived as stating actual fact about a
public figure (citing Hustler, supra note 44); and
Fall, 1990]
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dicta to establish an opinion privilege was improper."'8 According to the Court, the
lower courts' interpretation of the Gertz dicta would improperly protect "anything
that mightbe labeled opinion," even expressions of opinion that might "imply an as-
sertion of fact."1 9
The Court concluded that any privilege in addition to that already provided
under previous rulings is unnecessary to protect first amendment rights. 2 ' Rather,
such additional protection would hinder a plaintiff's ability to redress reputational
injury.' 2' Furthermore, by abolishing the opinion privilege, the Court hoped to
eliminate the difficult and often "artificial" fact-opinion distinction.'
Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed that no additional opinion privilege is
necessary because statements of pure opinion are adequately protected under present
first amendment doctrine. 123
In rejecting the absolute opinion privilege, the Supreme Court reinforced the
common law "fair comment" defense for honest expression of opinion based upon
true statements of fact.'1 In that sense, the Court's rejection of the opinion privilege
did not detract from first amendment rights. However, the Court did not eliminate
the difficult and often tenuous task of distinguishing between protected and unpro-
tected statements. It is this distinction upon which the balance of first amendment
rights depends. Thus, the method which the court selects to make this distinction
must perpetuate well-established first amendment protection.
In making this distinction, the Milkovich majority departed from all previous
rulings.125  The majority's "distinction test" placed greater emphasis upon the
protection of individual reputation than upon protection of free expression and
uninhibited discussion. However, the dissenting justices' "distinction analysis"
more properly balance these conflicting rights. 126
4) an appellate court must independently judge the entire record to insure that the lower court
judgment does not unduly restrict free expression (citing Bose Corporation v. Consumer
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).
"'Id. at 2705.
" Id.
'
20 Id. at 2706.
"I Id. The Court provided that the "'breathing space' which 'freedom of expression requires in order to
survive' is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an artificial
dichotomy between 'opinion' and 'fact'." Id.
122 Id.
12 JId. at 2708-09 (Brennan, J., dissent). Justice Brennan claimed that full constitutional protection is given
to statements of public concern "that cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts about an
individual." Id.
"' Id. at 2706. See also, supra note 24.
"'See Unelko v. Rooney 912 F.2d 1049, 1053. The Unelko court observed that Milkovich still allows
protection for "pure opinion", which includes "statements that do not imply facts capable of being proven
true or false." Id. at 1053, n.2.126
"' See Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2707-08.
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The Majority's Distinction Between Protected and
Unprotected Statements.
Having established that the lower courts' opinion privilege was unwarranted,
the Milkovich majority proceeded to provide a test to determine whether a particular
statement is protected under the first amendment.' 7 The Court's analysis focused
upon whether or not the allegedly defamatory statement implied an assertion of
fact. 1
28
Under the Court's test, a plaintiff must first establish that the statement was
provably false.1 29 The plaintiff must then prove that a reasonable fact finder, after
considering the statement's language 130 and general tenor,13 1 could conclude that the
statement implied an assertion of fact. 132
Thus, the Milkovich majority devised a three prong test to determine whether
a particular statement is protected. 33 Under the test, the Court determined that the
statements in the Diadiun article could imply that Milkovich committed perjury. 3"
Therefore, the Supreme Courtreversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of the media defendants and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceed-
ings consistent with the opinion. 35
TheMilkovich court finally provided one unified test that the lower courts may
use to determine whether a statement is protected. However, the Court failed to
sufficiently explain each prong of the test and to apply the test to the facts of this
case. 36 Without more precise guidance from the Supreme Court, the lower courts
are still left with the unenviable task of interpreting, analyzing, and applying each
prong. One benefit of the Court's vague analysis is that it has provided a malleable
standard which may be adapted to a wide range of defamation cases. 137 However,
127 Id. at 2707.
128 Id. at 2706-07.
129 Id. "... [TIhe connotation that [Milkovich] committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible
of being proved true or false." Id.
"'Id. "[The language] is not the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic language which would negate the
impression that the writer was seriously maintaining [that Milkovich] committed the crime of peijury." Id.
31 Id. "Nor does the general tenor of the article negate [the impression that the writer was seriously
maintaining that the petitioner committed perjury]." Id.
132 Id. "The dispositive question in the present case then becomes whether or not a reasonable fact finder
could conclude that the statements in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich
perjured himself in ajudicial proceeding." Id.
"' See Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1053.
1'3 Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2707.
135 Id. at 2708.
"
6 The ruling in Milkovich calls to mind the controversy evident in the Scott opinion supra note 50. In Scott,
the majoiity overruled the Ohio Supreme Court ruling in Milkovich, 15 Ohio St.3d 292,473 N.E.2d 1191
(1984), because in Milkovich, "no test was offered and no analysis was given for reaching the conclusion
that the article was fact and not opinion." Scott, 25 Ohio St.3d at 249, 496 N.E.2d at 705. This same
difficulty may face the Milkovich Supreme Court decision in the future. See also, supra note 101.
137 See Scott, 25 Ohio St.3d at 251,496 N.E.2d at 706. The Scott court adopted the totality of circumstances
test only as "a compass to show general direction and not a map to set rigid boundaries." Id.
Fall, 1990]
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the opinion's ambiguity will not allow media defendants to predict the types of
statements which are potentially defamatory. 38
The three prongs which the Court focused upon, verifiability, specific
language used, and the internal context or tone of the article, are similarto the factors
of other totality of circumstances tests.139  However, by failing to evaluate the
broader social context in which the article appears, the Milkovich test does not
consider the "total picture."'40 As a result, the Courtnarrowly construed the contours
of first amendment protection for statements of public interest. Consequently, the
Milkovich court has placed less emphasis on first amendment rights than its
predecessor courts.14 ' Although the majority believed that it "held the balance
true," 42 its decision safeguards the plaintiff's right to protect his or her reputation
more than any other decision in the New York Times progeny. Consequently, the ma-
jority's decision may "dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate," and
thereby offend the spirit of New York Times and its progeny.
43
Justice Brennan's Distinction Between Protected and
Non-Protected Statements.
Justice Brennan disagreed withthe majority's application of its distinction test
to the Diadiun article and its conclusion that the author could have implied
defamatory facts about Milkovich.I" Brennan characterized the majority's analysis
as too general1 45 and, thereby, undertook a more thorough evaluation of the facts. 46
As a result, Brennan concluded that the Diadiun statements were pure opinion and,
thus, were entitled to "full constitutional protection." 47
Brennan reasoned that the statements could not have been false'" because the
statements were mere conjecture. 49 Brennan also analyzed the specific language
138 See supra note 50.
139 See supra notes 58-60.
,1 See supra note 62 at 983-84.
"" See Milkovich, 110 S..Ct. at 2707-08. In concluding its analysis, the Milkovich court reemphasized the
individual right to protect our reputations from invasion. Id.
142 Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2708.
143 376 U.S. at 279.
'4 Milkovich, 110 S.Ct. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissent).
"43 Justice Brennan stated that the Court must provide further guidance for identifying when statements of
opinion imply false and defamatory fact. The Court must "confine the perimeters of [an] unprotected
category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be
inhibited." (quoting Bose Corp., supranote 117 at 505.). Id.
"
6 1d. at 2710-15.
147 Id. at 2709.
'" Id. at 2710. The majority merely stated that the question of whether Milkovich perjured himself was
readily discernible by comparing the testimony of the two proceedings. The majority reserved this
determination for the trial court on remand. Id. at 2707.
149 Id. at 2710. Justice Brennan defined conjecture as language that alerts the reader that the statement is
opinion, not fact. Id. at n. 5. Brennan emphasized that conjecture should be afforded the same constitutional
protection a "rhetorical hyperbole." Id. at 2714. When only some facts are known, conjecture must be
preserved and encouraged in order to subject important public questions to "'uninhibited, robust and wide-
[Vol. 24:2AKRON LAw REvIEw
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/9
MiIKovic vs. LositN JouRAL Co.
and internal content of the statements and concluded that the statements did not
imply a defamatory factual assertion. 150
In reaching this conclusion, Brennan presented a more detailed and thorough
analysis of each prong.'5 ' Analyzing the article's language, he pinpointed the spot
at which Diadiun stopped relying upon facts,152 the point at which the word selection
alerted the reader that the statements were conjecture,'53 and the words which would
cause a reasonable reader to perceive the language as cautionary, and thus to discount
it.'54
Finding that the article "notified readers to expect speculation and personal
judgment," Brennan analyzed the tone and format from a much broader perspective
than did the majority. 5 Brennan characterized the article as a "signed editorial
comment" which is a format that advises the reader to anticipate a departure from
what is actually known by the author as fact.'56 Brennan was able to recognize the
partiality of the article because he considered outside factors in his analysis, such as
the fact that the newspaper was published in the home town of Milkovich's opponent
high school.157 This should have warned the reader that the "opinions expressed may
rest on passion rather than factual foundation."'
Brennan's analysis is more valuablethanthe majority's analysis. His analysis
would guide the lower courts' interpretation of each prong of the majority's three
prong test. It provides much more than conclusory statements. It would enable a
media defendant to estimate a statement's defamatory nature.
Brennan's perspective is more consistent with past Supreme Court defamna-
tion decisions. 59 He began his analysis by reinforcing the importance of free
expression. 60 This perspective shaped Justice Brennan's analysis.
open' debate to which this country is profoundly committed." (quoting New York Times, supra note 27 at
270.). Id. Brennan contended that when statements are clearly conjecture, the plaintiff suffers no injury to
reputation. Id. at 2714-15. Brennan's dissent clearly emphasized First Amendment rights more than the
majority. Id. at 2715.
150 Id. at 2710-11.
151 Id. at 2710-13.
15 Id. at 2711-12. Diadiun wrote that he witnessed the altercation and the OHSAA hearing, but the writing
clearly revealed that he was not at the judicial proceeding. By quoting athird party's version of the judicial
proceedings, Diadiun alerted his readers that he was not at the proceeding.
153 Id. at 2711. Words such as "seemed", "probably" and "apparently" indicate to the reader that Diadiun
was offering conjecture.
1' Id. at 2712. "Cautionary language" puts the reader on notice that the author is not relying upon
defamatory but undisclosed facts.
155 I]d.
136 Id. at 2713 (citing Ollman v. Evans, supra note 11 at 986.).
151 Id. at h. 8. Justice Brennan observed that the impartiality of the article was clear because the author
represented one side of the controversy. Such impartiality cautions the reader that the article rests more on
"passion" than facts.
I 5s Id.
139 See supra, notes 33 and 34.
10 Id. at 2715. Brennan stated "it is...imperative that we take the most particular care where freedom of
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Brennan's first amendment perspective must be preserved. By rejecting
absolute immunity for opinion, the Milkovich court effectively narrowed the type of
expression that will be constitutionally protected in future court decisions.
161
Constitutional protection requires emphasis of first amendment rights when deter-
mining whetherparticular statements are protected. B y considering the total picture,
Brennan is able to preserve first amendment rights.
Contrasting the Majority's and Minority's Distinction of
Protected and Unprotected Statements.
The contrast between the majority and the dissenting opinions illustrates the
problems of developing an effective test to distinguish between protected and
unprotected statements.162 Often, courts can reach any conclusion they desire under
any of the tests. 163 The definition of protected speech rests on a particular court's
preference to emphasize either first amendment rights of the right to protect one's
reputation.
The trend of the Supreme Court decisions since New York Times emphasized
the importance of protecting free speech.164 Milkovich dramatically departs from
this trend by favoring the right to protect one's reputation over the right to freedom
of expression. By insisting that freedom of expression must be protected, the
Brennan dissent better balances these two policy concerns.
CONCLUSION
In Milkovich, 165the Supreme Court held that statements of opinion are not
constitutionally privileged. The Court concluded that prior Supreme Court rulings
adequately safeguard the first amendment freedom of expression.166 The Court
determined that the Gertz 167dicta did not immunize opinions from defamation
liability.
Prior to Milkovich, the Supreme Court did not help lower courts to distinguish
between statements which are protected under the First Amendment and those that
speech is at risk, not only in articulating the rules mandated by the First Amendment, but also in applying
them." Id.
161 Id. at 2705-06.
lS2 See Scott supra note 50, at 265 n. 8,496 N.E.2d at 717. Justice Celebrezze was concerned that the totality
of circumstances analysis applied by the majority would allow statements to be characterized as fact or
opinion merely on the basis of a particular judge's preference. Id.
1
63 Id.
See supra notes 33 and 34.
110 S.Ct. 2695.
'"See, e.g., New YorkTimes, 376 U.S. 254; CurtisPublishing, 388 U.S. 130; Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Greenbelt,
398 U.S. 6; Hepps, 475 U.S. 767; Hustler, 485 U.S. 46.
167 418 U.S. at 3007. See supra note 9.
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are not protected. 68 The Milkovich majority established a new three prong "totality
of the circumstances" test to make this distinction. 169 The test considers the
verifiability, specific language, and the general tenor of the allegedly defamatory
statements.170 TheMilkovich majority failedto analyze these factors. The majority's
opinion will not help lower courts to interpret these factors. Furthermore, the
majority's perspective is quite different from that of previous Supreme Court
rulings. Since New York Times, the Supreme Court had emphasized the importance
of safeguarding first amendment freedom of expression. Milkovich marks a sharp
divergence from this philosophy. In arriving at its decision, the majority placed the
individual right to protect one's reputation above first amendment rights.' 7 '
The Brennan dissent follows previous Supreme Court philosophy more
closely. Brennan's analysis is based upon the Court's commitment to preserve free
and uninhibited debate of public issues.172 Brennan also offered greater guidance to
lower courts through his analysis of many contextual factors. Thus, Brennan's
analysis would also enable the media to more accurately predict the scope of first
amendment protection.
By establishing that no independent "opinion privilege" exists, the Supreme
Court narrowed First Amendment rights that the lower courts had previously
afforded media defendants. The majority's analysis of its three prong test narrowed
these rights even futher. The Court's decision could stifle debate on controversial
public matters. The majority's analysis will resurrect the "self-censorship" which
the Supreme Court has attempted to prevent since New York Times.
SHERA NooNAN
See supra, notes 10 and 11.
6 110 S.Ct. at 2706-08.
0Id.
"I Id. at 2707-08.
72 Id. at 2715.
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